Using the Right Tool for the Job: Mediator Leverage and Conflict Resolution by Beardsley, Kyle
Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 
Volume 2 Issue 1 
April 2013 
Using the Right Tool for the Job: Mediator Leverage and Conflict 
Resolution 
Kyle Beardsley 
Emory College of Arts & Sciences, Emory University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/jlia 
 Part of the Diplomatic History Commons, History of Science, Technology, and Medicine Commons, 
International and Area Studies Commons, International Law Commons, International Trade Law 
Commons, Law and Politics Commons, Political Science Commons, Public Affairs, Public Policy and 




2 Penn St. J.L. & Int'l Aff. 57 (2013). 
The Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs is a joint publication of Penn State’s School of Law and 
School of International Affairs. 
 
Penn State 
Journal of Law & International Affairs 
2013 VOLUME 2 NO. 1 
57 
 
USING THE RIGHT TOOL FOR THE JOB: 




There is tremendous variation in how third parties conduct 
international mediation.1 Mediation might involve such functions as 
the mere hosting of talks, substantive participation in the negotiation 
process, shuttle diplomacy, or heavy-handed involvement in which 
the third party shapes the incentives of the parties to reach an 
agreement.2 With such possible variation, mediators must especially 
tailor the level of leverage—the extent to which the third party uses 
                                                 
* Kyle Beardsley, Associate Professor of Political Science, Emory College 
of Arts & Sciences, Emory University. 
1 Mediation entails permissive third-party engagement with multiple 
disputants in a peace process. 
2 The mediation literature has focused on three main styles of mediation 
that need not be mutually exclusive: facilitation, formulation and manipulation. See 
generally Kyle C. Beardsley, David M. Quinn, Bidisha Biswas & Jonathan 
Wilkenfeld, Mediation Style and Crisis Outcomes, 50 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 58 (2006); 
Jacob Bercovitch, Mediation in International Conflict: An Overview of Theory, a Review of 
Practice, in PEACEMAKING IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT: METHODS & 
TECHNIQUES 125-53 (I. William Zartman & J. Lewis Rasmussen eds., 1997); I. 
William Zartman & Saadia Touval, International Mediation, in LEASHING THE DOGS 
OF WAR: CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN A DIVIDED WORLD 437-54 (Chester A. 
Crocker et al. eds., 2007); Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Kathleen J. Young, David M. 
Quinn & Victor Asal, MEDIATING INTERNATIONAL CRISES (2005); David Quinn, 
Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Pelin Eralp, Victor Asal & Theodore McLauchlin, Crisis 
Managers but Not Conflict Resolvers: Mediating Ethnic Intrastate Conflicts in Africa, 
CONFLICT MGMT. & PEACE SCI. (forthcoming 2013). 
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positive and negative inducements, either explicit or implicit, to move 
negotiations forward—to the needs of the situation.3 In international 
dispute mediation, a one-size-fits-all view of mediation may actually 
inhibit effective conflict resolution. 
This essay highlights the importance of third parties choosing 
their mediation styles with eyes wide open to the context of the 
conflict. In what follows, this essay first considers existing studies 
that have found both potential benefits and risks of heavy-handed 
third-party involvement—which rely on implicit or explicit threats of 
punishment or promises of assistance—as a conflict-management 
strategy.4 It then considers a few illustrative cases to demonstrate the 
importance of making sure that the tools of mediation fit the context. 
Finally, it concludes with a discussion of how sustained post-conflict 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding can reduce some of the risks of 
leverage in mediation. 
I. THE STRENGTHS AND RISKS OF LEVERAGE IN EXISTING STUDIES 
Starting with the upside of leverage, existing work has found 
that it is often critical that international dispute mediators employ 
positive and negative inducements in a way that creates sufficient 
                                                 
3 The use of leverage matches to the “manipulative” style used in the 
literature referenced above. See, e.g., Peter J. D. Carnevale, Strategic Choice in 
Mediation, 2 NEGOT. J. 41, 44-45 (1986) (characterizing the use of leverage in 
mediation as involving “compensation” and “pressing” tactics). In addition to 
“manipulation,” the use of leverage is also sometimes referred to as a “directive” 
style of mediation. See, e.g., KENNETH KRESSEL, LABOR MEDIATION: AN 
EXPLORATORY SURVEY 13 (1972); Peter J. D. Carnevale & Richard Pegnetter, The 
Selection of Mediation Tactics in Public-Sector Disputes, 41 J. SOC. ISSUES 65, 67 (1985). 
Moreover, the use of leverage can also be termed “power” mediation. See, e.g., 
Loraleigh Keashly & Ronald J. Fisher, A Contingency Perspective on Conflict Interventions: 
Theoretical and Practical Considerations, in RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS: 
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MEDIATION 235 (Jacob Bercovitch ed., 1996); 
Isak Svensson, Mediation with Muscles or Minds? Exploring Power Mediators and Pure 
Mediators in Civil Wars, 12 INT’L NEGOT. 229, 230 (2007). But see Robert Rauchhaus, 
Asymmetric Information, Mediation and Conflict Management, 58 WORLD POL. 207, 224-
25, 233 (2006) (terming it “heavy” mediation). 
4 Mediation with leverage can involve both immediate inducements for 
agreement or pledges of future inducements to help guarantee the peace. 
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leverage to incentivize the disputing parties to reach an agreement.5 
Intractable conflicts often need external prodding to create a sense of 
a mutually hurting stalemate when the status quo level of hostilities 
seems more acceptable to the parties than taking political or security 
risks in making substantial concessions.6 The set of tools available to 
intermediaries that do not use leverage is indeed quite limited. Third 
parties that merely serve a role of providing the disputants with 
greater clarity of the relevant parameters often struggle to learn 
information that the disputants themselves do not already know or to 
convey credibly such information, or both.7 Moreover, third parties 
that are unable to use leverage to guarantee settlements reached 
during negotiations will be unable to resolve concerns of mistrust 
between vulnerable actors who might be reluctant to reach a deal that 
obliges them to draw down their security forces.8 Leverage might also 
be needed to shield the disputants from political backlash for 
unpopular concessions.9 
                                                 
5 This relates to work pioneered by Jacob Bercovitch on contingency 
theory. See generally, e.g., Jacob Bercovitch & Scott Sigmund Gartner, Is There Method 
in the Madness of Mediation? Some Lessons for Mediators from Quantitative Studies of 
Mediation, 32 INT’L INTERACTIONS 329 (2006); Jacob Bercovitch & Richard 
Jackson, Negotiation or Mediation?: An Exploration of Factors Affecting the Choice of 
Conflict Management in International Conflict, 17 NEGOT. J. 59 (2001); Jacob Bercovitch 
& Jeffrey Langley, The Nature of the Dispute and the Effectiveness of International 
Mediation, 37 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 670 (1993).  
6 I. William Zartman & Saadia Touval, International Mediation: Conflict 
Resolution and Power Politics, 41 J. SOC. ISSUES 27, 41 (1985); Zartman & Touval, 
International Mediation, supra note 2; Saadia Touval, Why the U.N. Fails, 73 FOREIGN 
AFF. 44, 51 (1994); Moorad Mooradian & Daniel Druckman, Hurting Stalemate or 
Mediation? The Conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, 1990-95, 36 J. PEACE RES. 709, 712 
(1999); Svensson, Mediation with Muscles or Minds?, supra note 3 at 237. See also Molly 
M. Melin, When States Mediate, 2 PENN. ST. J.L.& INT’L AFF. 78 (2013) (offering an 
account of how actors with leverage are deemed more acceptable by disputants).  
7 See Mark Fey & Kristopher W. Ramsay, When is Shuttle Diplomacy Worth 
the Commute? Information Sharing Through Mediation, 62 WORLD POL. 529, 531 (2010); 
Alastair Smith & Allan Stam, Mediation and Peacekeeping in a Random Walk Model of 
Civil and Interstate War, 5 INT’L STUD. REV. 115, 117 (2003). 
8 See generally BARBARA F. WALTER, COMMITTING TO PEACE: THE 
SUCCESSFUL SETTLEMENT OF CIVIL WARS (2002). 
9 See Kyle Beardsley & Nigel Lo, Third-Party Conflict Management and the 
Willingness to Make Concessions, J. CONFLICT RESOL. (forthcoming 2013). 
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On the other hand, even though many negotiations critically 
depend on third-party pressure, there are also real risks for using too 
much third-party leverage when less would suffice. Not only is 
leverage more costly to the third party, which often must follow 
through on threats and promises, but it can prove detrimental to 
peace stability in the long term. When third parties are heavy handed 
in their approach, they create artificial incentives for agreements that 
are not likely sustainable over time.10 As a third-party’s interests shift 
and influence wanes, former combatants that had reached an 
agreement primarily because of the third-party’s enticements will be 
more prone to abandon their agreements than former combatants 
that reached an agreement with less incentivizing. The problem of 
attenuated third-party involvement is especially strong when multiple 
third parties are involved heavy-handedly in the peace process 
because of the more difficult coordination needs in the post-conflict 
setting.11 Separately, mediation with leverage can also restrict the 
ability for disputants to walk away from negotiations that their 
opponent is pursuing as a simple stalling tactic or that are otherwise 
destined to fail.12 
The existing work on mediation regarding these tradeoffs 
suggests a basic rule of thumb that mediation with leverage should be 
reserved only to stop ongoing or imminent massive bloodshed, 
especially when the violence endangers non-combatants. That is, the 
                                                 
10 See KYLE BEARDSLEY, THE MEDIATION DILEMMA (2011); Kyle 
Beardsley, Agreement Without Peace? International Mediation and Time Inconsistency 
Problems, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 723, 737 (2008); Suzanne Werner & Amy Yuen, 
Making and Keeping Peace, 59 INT’L ORG. 261, 269 (2005); Mehmet Gurses, Patrick 
McLeod & Nicolas Rost, Mediating Civil War Settlements and the Duration of Peace, 34 
INT’L INTERACTIONS 129, 136 (2008); Zartman & Touval, International Mediation, 
supra note 2 at 452 (highlights the dilemma that mediators face in choosing to push 
for an early ceasefire or wait for a durable settlement to emerge). 
11 See BEARDSLEY, THE MEDIATION DILEMMA, supra note 10; Tobias 
Böhmelt, Disaggregating Mediations: The Impact of Multiparty Mediation, 41 BRIT. J. POL. 
SCI. 859, 860 (2011); Chester A. Crocker, Pamela Aall & Fen Osler Hampson, Is 
More Better?: The Pros and Cons of Multiparty Mediation, in TURBULENT PEACE: THE 
CHALLENGES OF MANAGING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 497-513 (Chester A. 
Crocker et al. eds., 2001); Birger Heldt, The Lack of Coordination in Diplomatic 
Peacemaking, 2 PENN. ST. J.L.& INT’L AFF. 9 (2013). 
12 See generally Kyle Beardsley, Intervention without Leverage: Explaining the 
Prevalence of Weak Mediators, 35 INT’L INTERACTIONS 272 (2009). 
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use of strong mediation should be motivated primarily out of short-
term humanitarian goals in order to justify the long-term risks of 
making post-conflict peace more fragile and the lack of patience in 
waiting for a more organic peace to emerge. At the same time, more 
minimal third-party involvement should be used when a long-term, 
self-enforcing peace is the most pressing concern and humanitarian 
responsibilities are not as pressing. Indeed, it is difficult, and in many 
cases impossible, for third parties to successfully attain both an 
immediate reduction in hostilities and a long-term resolution of the 
relevant points of contention. 
II. MATCHING THE TOOL TO THE PROBLEM IN PRACTICE 
It is helpful to consider historical cases in which hindsight 
suggests that third parties used too little or too much leverage, as well 
as cases in which the level of leverage more appropriately matched 
the needs of the situation. The problem of not using sufficient 
leverage when it is needed to stop mass atrocities can be seen recently 
in Syria.13 Kofi Annan’s initiative to facilitate a ceasefire between 
Assad and the rebels never had teeth as long as Russia and China 
blocked passage of U.N. Security Council resolutions that would 
authorize punishment for continued intransigence and as long as a 
coalition of the willing to threaten Assad failed to materialize. During 
the ceasefire, Assad was more or less free to continue direct attacks 
against rebel positions and indirect attacks against sympathizers via 
support for pro-government militias. 
On the flip side, the risk of using too much short-term 
leverage was demonstrated perhaps most dramatically in the lead up 
to the 1994 Rwanda genocide.14 The 1993 Arusha Accords resulted 
from substantial third-party pressure and the promise of a 
peacekeeping force to guarantee the peace. However, once the 
mediator involvement waned upon the signing of the Accords and 
                                                 
13 J. Michael Greig, in this issue, provides a detailed account of why this 
conflict has proven so difficult to manage. J. Michael Greig, Intractable Syria? Insights 
from the Scholarly Literature on the Failure of Mediation, 2 PENN. ST. J.L.& INT’L AFF. 48 
(2013). 
14 See Alan J. Kuperman, The Other Lesson of Rwanda: Mediators Sometimes 
Do More Damage than Good, 16 SAIS REV. 221, 222 (1996). 
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the peacekeeping force turned out to be weaker than expected and 
slow to deploy, implementation of the Accords failed and a window 
of opportunity for Hutu extremist militias to establish their 
dominance emerged. Stated more particularly, the leverage of the 
mediating parties, coupled with their inability to follow through on 
their commitments, left much of the Tutsi and moderate Hutu 
populations vulnerable to annihilation perpetrated by Hutu militia 
groups intentionally left out of the peace process. It is also important 
to note that the violence during the Rwandan civil war that preceded 
the Accords was not nearly as threatening to non-combatant 
populations as the genocide that followed. That is, the heavy-handed 
third-party involvement, in retrospect, was not well justified on 
humanitarian grounds. 
More positively, Richard Holbrooke’s role in pushing for the 
Dayton Accords amidst NATO bombings of Serbian positions at the 
end of the Bosnian War presents a compelling example of a case in 
which the use of much needed leverage effectively calmed a 
humanitarian disaster. Prior to the extreme heavy-handed 
intervention, earlier mediation attempts lacking sufficient leverage 
failed to halt the violence. These earlier efforts stand in stark contrast 
to Holbrooke’s role, such that it is often lamented that the 
international community did not act stronger sooner. Note that this 
does not mean that Holbrooke’s role is an appropriate model of how 
third parties can foster long-term, self-enforcing peace, as Bosnia 
continues to sit on a razor’s edge with a real risk of returning to 
interethnic conflict. But it does well demonstrate that strong third-
party involvement is often necessary to stop the killing and force a 
hurting stalemate, and that the risks of long-term instability may very 
well be worth the intervention. 
Another example of a well-matched mediation effort, Marti 
Ahtisaari’s role in the Aceh peace process, which led to the 
transformation of the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) from a rebel 
group to a legitimate political actor, demonstrates the promise of 
more hands-off involvement being better able to facilitate long-term 
peace. As the former president of Finland and founder of the Crisis 
Management Initiative, Ahtisaari lacked any ability to manipulate the 
incentives of the disputants, but he was able to shape the momentum 
for peace—generated by the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami and 
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military gains by Indonesian forces—and help formulate an 
agreement that involved concessions on both sides with an eye 
toward long-term political transformation. This example, however, 
illustrates that while agreements that result from softer forms of 
mediation are more likely to become self-sustaining, the problem is in 
getting to the agreement in the first place. Without leverage, the 
parties already have to be motivated to resolve their dispute 
peacefully, but that is often asking quite a lot. Weak mediation may 
not carry much risk, but it also might not carry much value added 
when a protracted conflict environment needs more third-party 
engagement. That is, weak mediation can perform quite well when 
the conflict is already “ripe” for resolution, but it can struggle to help 
“ripen” the conflict in the first place.15 
III. COMBINING MEDIATION WITH PEACEKEEPING AND 
PEACEBUILDING 
In light of the limitations and risks surrounding the use of 
leverage, single third-party efforts generally fail to produce both 
immediate humanitarian relief to the bloodiest conflicts and long-
term conflict resolution. As such, it is helpful to think more broadly 
about peace processes as potentially involving multiple third-party 
efforts that unfold over time. Post-conflict peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding, when effective, can supplement mediator efforts to 
achieve both short-term and long-term effects.16 If there is sufficient 
international will to sustain leverage and engagement after hostilities 
have attenuated, then mediation is not likely to create a large risk for 
a fragile peace after short-term success in attenuating the hostilities. 
                                                 
15 See I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN, RIPE FOR RESOLUTION: CONFLICT AND 
INTERVENTION IN AFRICA 266 (1985); J. Michael Greig, Moments of Opportunity: 
Recognizing Conditions of Ripeness for International Mediation between Enduring Rivals, 45 J. 
CONFLICT RESOL. 691, 692 (2001) (overviews what ripeness entails). 
16 Peacekeeping and peacebuilding both entail permissive third-party 
involvement for the purposes of enhancing the stability and duration of peace in a 
post-conflict environment. Peacekeeping implies a military component, and 
peacebuilding implies a political, social or economic component. These terms often 
overlap but need not be provided by the same third parties performing mediation. 
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Turning first to peacekeeping, deploying international forces 
can maintain the outside pressure that existed at the time of 
agreement and keep the parties motivated to uphold their 
commitments. That being said, peacekeeping is expensive—even 
when the costs can be distributed across U.N. or regional 
organization memberships—and the financial and decision-making 
burdens often fall to those third parties in the developed world that 
are fairly insulated from the externalities of recurrent conflict. So, 
peacekeeping cannot be counted on as a solution to the mediation 
attenuation problem because third parties that would be willing to 
step in as peacekeepers and indefinitely remain engaged as guarantors 
of the peace are often hard to find.17 
Peacebuilding missions that follow intrastate conflict provide 
an interesting middle ground, and their increasing prominence is 
perhaps well justified given how they can help resolve the long-term 
issues caused by heavy-handed, third-party involvement. 
Peacebuilding encompasses a number of reforms that can include 
various dimensions of political, economic and security sector 
reform.18 Relevant to the long-term risks related to heavy-handed 
mediation, one of the central goals of peacebuilding is to ensure that 
the key stakeholders are invested in maintaining peace and not 
dependent on third-party inducements. Through the promotion of 
democracy and power sharing, peacebuilding strives to enable the 
voices of each of the key constituent groups to be heard; through the 
promotion of economic development, peacebuilding strives to 
diversify the set of groups that would benefit from sustained peace; 
and through security sector reform, peacebuilding strives to improve 
the capacity of the state to maintain order and reduce the ability for 
one side to threaten others through use of the state security 
apparatus. While peacebuilding that follows strong mediation can 
                                                 
17 See generally VIRGINIA PAGE FORTNA, DOES PEACEKEEPING WORK?: 
SHAPING BELLIGERENTS’ CHOICE AFTER CIVIL WAR (2008); MICHAEL W. DOYLE 
& NICHOLAS SAMBANIS, MAKING WAR AND BUILDING PEACE: UNITED NATIONS 
PEACE OPERATIONS (2006). This is not to say that peacekeeping is ineffective 
when it occurs, which would be inconsistent with some of the existing literature. 
The point is that peacekeeping cannot be taken as a given supplement to mediator 
leverage, as it still depends crucially on third-party long-term investment. 
18 See ROLAND PARIS, AT WAR’S END: BUILDING PEACE AFTER CIVIL 
CONFLICT 38-39 (2004). 
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help bridge the gap between the incentives at the time of agreement 
and the incentives in the future in the absence of sustained third-
party engagement, an important caveat is that peacebuilding in many 
post-conflict states might be more accurately described as nation 
building and still needs substantial, sustained international 
involvement for self-sustaining peace to adhere. Moreover, a close 
equivalent of peacebuilding does not in practice exist for interstate 
conflicts. 
CONCLUSION 
This article has considered the risks inherent in deciding how 
much leverage a third party should bring to bear in a conflict 
management effort. Too much leverage, especially when the leverage 
is difficult to sustain indefinitely, can risk promoting artificial 
incentives that lead to fragile terms of peace. Too little leverage in the 
face of ongoing and imminent bloodshed carries obvious 
humanitarian risks. The lesson to take away from this analysis is not 
that mediators can do no good. Indeed, mediators can do much good 
when they are able to use leverage to stop ongoing brutal violence in 
the short-term, especially when they can sustain that leverage over 
time. Moreover, mediators can do much good when they use lighter 
tactics to help disputants get over some of the final barriers to 
durable settlements that are not negotiated under duress. In these 
ways, practitioners of mediation can choose the form of their 
involvement with accurate expectations of both the potential merits 
of involvement and the potential risks. 
 
